A proposition ... is a portion of discourse in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. ... but as we cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together, that they are intended to be affirmed of denied of the other ... it is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention. .. . This is sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an inflection ; as when we say, Fire burns... . But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word is, when an affirmation is intended, is not, when a negation; or by some other part of the verb to be. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called as we formely observed, the copula. It is important that there should be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the copula; for confused notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread mysticism over the field of logic, and perverted its speculations into logomachies.
[A] It is apt to be supposed that the copula is something more than a mere sign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the proposition, Socrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that the quality just can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that Socrates is, that is to say exists. This, however, only show that there is an ambiguity in the word is; a word which not only performs the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of which it may itself be made the predicate of a proposition. That the employment of it as a copula does not necessarily include the affirmation of existence, appears from such a proposition as this, A centaur is a fiction of the poets; where it cannot possibly be implied that a centaur exists, since the proposition itself expressly asserts that the thing has no real existence.
[B] Many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations concerning the nature of Being (τὸ ὄν, oὐσία, Ens, Entitas, Essentia, and the like) which have arisen from overlooking this double meaning of the word to be; from supposing that when it signifies to exist, and when it signifies to be some specified thing, as to be a man, to be Socrates, to be seen or spoken of, to be a phantom, even to be a nonentity, it must, still, at bottom, answer to the same idea; and that a meaning must be found for it which shall suit all these cases. The fog which rose from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over the whole surface of metaphysics. [C] Yet it becomes us not to triumph over the great intellects of Plato and Aristotle because we are now able to preserve ourselves from many errors into which they, perhaps inevitably, fell. The fireteazer of a modern steam-engine produces by his exertions far greater effects than Milo of Crotona could, but he is not therefore a stronger man. [D] The Greeks seldom knew any language but their own. This rendered it far more difficult for them than it is for us, to acquire a readiness in detecting ambiguities. One of the advantages of having accurately studied a plurality of languages, especially of those languages which eminent thinkers have used as the vehicle of their thoughs, is the practical lesson we learn respecting the ambiguities of words, by finding that the same word in one language corresponds, on different occasions, to different words in another. When not this exerciese, even the strongest understandings find it difficult to believe that things which have a common names, have not in some respect or other a common nature; and often expend much laboure not only unprofitably but mischievously (as was frequently done by the two philosphers just mentioned) in vain attempts to discover in what this common nature consists. But the habit once formed, intellects much inferior are capable of detecting even ambiguities which are common to many languages: and it is surprising that the one now under consideration, though it exists in the modern languages as well as in the ancient, should have been overlooked by almost all authors. [E] The quantity of futile speculation which had been causes by a misapprehension of the nature of the copula, was hinted at by Hobbes; but Mr. Mill (Analysis of the Human Mind, i. 126 et seqq.) was, I believe, the first who distinctly characterized the ambiguity, and pointed out how many errors in the received systems of philosophy it has had to answer for. It has indeed misled the moderns scarcely less than the ancients, though their mistakes, because our understandings are not yet so completely emancipated from their influence, do not appear equally irrational.
Mill zde tvrdí řadu věcí, z nichž bych rád vyzvihl následující:
[A] Slovesná spona 'je' má dva základní (a zcela odlišné) významy: predikativní a existenční. Argument: predikujeme i o neexistujích subjektech.
[B] Přehlédnutí této dvojznačnosti vedlo k metafyzickým pseudoproblémům ohledně bytí a spřízněných témat.
[C] To, že je nám tato dvojznačnost jasná, neznamená, že jsme chytřejší než Platón či Aristotelés, kteří ji přehlédli.Mill zde tvrdí řadu věcí, z nichž bych rád vyzvihl následující:
[A] Slovesná spona 'je' má dva základní (a zcela odlišné) významy: predikativní a existenční. Argument: predikujeme i o neexistujích subjektech.
[B] Přehlédnutí této dvojznačnosti vedlo k metafyzickým pseudoproblémům ohledně bytí a spřízněných témat.
[D] Důvodem jejich přehlédnutí byla neznalost jiných jazyků než řečtiny.
[E] Dvojznačnost pravděpodobně objevil Millův otec, James Mill (1773–1836, k jeho politickému myšlení viz SEP).
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