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pondělí 17. ledna 2011

Richard Whately (1787–1863)

Vlasta Vohánka mě upozornil na několik zajímavostí ohledně Richarda Whatelyho (1787–1863), anglikánského arcibiskupa v Dublinu. Podle článku Victora Sancheze Valencii (v monumentální sérii Dov Gabbaye a John Woodse, Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 3, 2004, s. 404-405) ho Augustus de Morgan (1806–1871) čestně charakterizuje jako "obnovitele logických studií v Anglii" (the restorer of logical study in England). Ač sám nedosáhl nových převratných výsledků v logice, Whateley vypreparoval základní materiál post-středověké logické tradice a transformoval ji do moderní koncepce:
  1. logika je teoretická věda, nikoli umění mající čistě instrumentální roli pro (ostatní) vědy;
  2. logika se primárně týká jazyka a jen sekundárně myšlení (inspirace Lockem); 
  3. logika se podobá aritmetice (inspirace Leibnizem);
Logika je podle Whateleyho formální věda zabívající se platností a neplatností argumentů. Whately prý jako první učinil radikální krok v tom, že oddělil (v dnešním smyslu slova) logiku od epistemologie. A zde patrně bude důvod, proč s ním nesouhlasí Mill, který, jak jsme viděli (14.1.2010), pojímá logiku tradičně obsáhlým způsobem. (Takže jeho System of Logic je v moderní zkrácené edici Ernsta Nagela nazvána Philosophy of Scientific Method).

Whateleyho zásluha (tedy pokud to je opravdu zásluha) na koncepci současné logiky byla zastíněna a překryta jeho důrazem na syllogismus jako kanonickou formu deduktivních úsudků, čímž získal v povědomí logiků spíše špatnou pověst. (Překonání této teze je chápáno jako revoluční objev současné logiky, třebaže i zde jsou někteří logikové v dissentu, např. Fred Sommers).



Kromě logiky je Whately důležitý i pro filosofii náboženství a apologetiku. Velmi dobrá je Whateleyho předmluva k novému vydání Paleyho View of the Evidences of Christianity (z r. 1794), která byla povinnou literaturou v Cambridgi až do dvacátých let našeho století. Zde je oblíbený Vlastův citát z Whateleyho (opět kvůli nedostatku času nepřeložen):

"Infidelity – or at least that approach to Infidelity, the absence of a well-grounded and firm belief – is among the chief causes of the present evils under which we suffer. Men’s faith was not fixed upon that foundation of rational evidence upon which Christ and his Apostles placed it. No proportionate care was taken to make men’s knowledge of that evidence keep pace with the advance of their knowledge of other things; and then, when doubts began to spread, it was sought to restore or to confirm belief, by appealing to the imagination and the feelings, rather than to the reason. Those who hardly agreed in any thing else, agreed in dreading to take the only safe course. While one party told men to trust the Church on its own word, and the other to trust the Scripture without one intelligible reason for believing it divine, what wonder is it that so many have made up their minds to trust neither, and so many more are vainly struggling to maintain a firm faith without a firm foundation for it?"

 Za překlad do češtiny stojí celá předmluva. Neméně aktuální v Anglii r. 1859 jako v Čechách r. 2011.

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Aktualizace 02.04.2014: Whateley je i autorem patrně první argumentační mapy (Elements of Logic, ed1852: 467). Argumenty pro Y je X jsou dva, tj. je zde naznačeno, že jsou induktivní:


pátek 14. ledna 2011

Exkurs: John Stuart Mill a jeho System of Logic (1843)

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) je znám díky své politické filosofii, utilitarismu a empiricismu, jeho význam a vliv je ovšem daleko hlubší (viz SEP). Jeho System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, vydán poprvé r. 1843 a v páté edici r. 1862, je podnes zmiňován např. v souvislosti s debatou o vlastních jménech (zda mají význam či nikoli) a včera jsme si uvedli Kahnovu tezi, podle níž od Milla pochází i moderní Frege-Russelova dichotomická (příp. kvadratomická) interpretace slovesné spony 'je'.  

System of Logic s podtitulem Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation je zajímavé dílo samo o sobě. Skládá se z 6 knih ve dvou svazcích. Jeden z hlavních rozdílů oproti moderním učebnicím logiky je to, že zahrnuje témata nejen formální, ale i materiální logiky (oproti scholastickým učebnicím ovšem Mill hájí důležitost rozvoje induktivní logiky; zdá se, že např. proti Richardu Whatelymu). Mill v přemluvě říká, že své dílo nepovažuje za originální ve svých částech, ale v tom, že je to údajně první souhrnný přehled nejnovějších poznatků o operacích intelektu:

"This book makes no pretence of giving to the world a new theory of the intellectual operations. Its claim to attention ... is grounded on the fact that it is an attempt ... to embody and systematize, the best ideas which have been either promulgated on its subject by speculative writers, or confomed to by accurate thinkers in the scientific inquiries." p. iii

Abychom si uvědomili šíři Millova podujetí, uveďme si jeho obsah (pouze u první knihy i s rozepsáním jednotlivých paragrafů):

VOLUME I
Preface (to the First Edition, the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth) 
Introduction
    §1. A definition at the commencement of a subject must be provisional 
    §2. Is logic the art and science of reasoning?
    §3. Or the art and science of the pursuit of truth? 
    §4. Logic is concerned with inferences, not with intuitive truths
    §5. Relation of logic to other sciences 
    §6. Its utility, how shown
    §7. Definition of logic stated and illustrated

Book I: Of Names and Propositions
Ch. 1: Of the necessity of commencing with an Analysis of Language
    §1. Theory of names, why a necessary part of logic
    §2. First step in the analysis of Propositions
    §3. Names must be studied before Things
Ch. 2: Of Names
    §1. Names are names of things, not of our ideas
    §2. Words which are not names, but parts of names

    §3. General and Singular names

    §4. Concrete and Abstract
    §5. Connotative and Non-connotative

    §6. Positive and Negative

    §7. Relative and Absolute
   §8. Univocal and Aequivocal
 
Ch. 3: Of the Things denoted by Names
    §1. Necessity of an enumeration of Nameable Things. The Categories of Aristotle
    §2. Ambiguity of the most general names
    §3. Feelings, or states of consciousness
    §4. Feelings must be distinguished from the physical antecedents. Perceptions
    §5. Volitions, and Actions
    §6. Substance and Attribute
    §7. Body
    §8. Mind
    §9. Qualities
    §10. Relations
    §11. Resemblance
    §12. Quantity
    §13. All attributes of bodies are grounded on states of consciousness
    §14. So also all attributes of ming
    §15. Recapitulation

Ch. 4: Of Propositions
   
§1. Nature and office of the copula
    §2. Affirmative and Negative propositions
    §3. Simple and Complex
    §4. Universal, Particular, and Singular
Ch. 5: Of the Import of Propositions
    §1. Doctrine that a proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas
    §2. Doctrine that it is the expression of a relation between the meanings of two names
    §3. Doctrine that it consists in referring to something to, or expluding something from, a class
    §4. What it really is
    §5. It asserts (or denies) a sequence, a coexistence, a simple existence, a causation
    §6. - or a resemblance
    §7. Propositions of which the terms are abstract
Ch. 6: Of Propositions merely Verbal
    §1. Essential and Accidental propositions
    §2. All essential propositions are identical propositions
    §3. Individuals have no essences
    §4. Real propositions, how distinguished from verbal
    §5. Two modes of representing the import of a Real proposition
Ch. 7: Of the Nature of Classification, and the Five Predicables
    §1. Classification, how connected with Naming
    §2. The Predicables
    §3. Genus and Species
    §4. Kinds have a real existence in nature
    §5. Differentia
    §6. Differentiae for general purposes, and differentiae for special or technical purposes
    §7. Proprium
    §8. Accidens
Ch. 8: Of Definition
    §1. A definition
    §2. Every name can be defined, whose meaning is susceptible of analysis
    §3. Complete, how distinguished from incomplete definitions
    §4. - and from descriptions
    §5. What are called definitions of Things, are definitions of Names with an implied assumption of the existence of Things corresponding to them
    §6. - even when such things do not in reality exist
    §7. Definitions, though of names only, must be grounded on knowledge of the corresponding Things


Book II: Of Reasoning
Ch. 1: Of Inferences, or Reasoning, in general
Ch. 2: Of Ratiocination, or Syllogism
Ch. 3: Of the Function, and Logical Value, of the Syllogism
Ch. 4: Of Trains of Reasoning, and Deductive Sciences
Ch. 5: Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths
Ch. 6: The same Subject continued
Ch. 7: Examination of some Opinions opposed to the preceding doctrines 

Book III: Of Induction
Ch. 1: Preliminary Observations on Induction in general
Ch. 2: Of Induction properly so called
Ch. 3: On the Ground of Induction
Ch. 4: Of Laws of Nature
Ch. 5: Of the Laws of Universal Causation
Ch. 6: Of the Composition of Causes
Ch. 7: Of Observation and Experiment
Ch. 8: Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry
Ch. 9: Miscellaneous Examples of the Four Methods
Ch. 10: Of Plurality of Causes; and of the Intermixture of Effects
Ch. 11: Of the Deductive Method
Ch. 12: Of the Explanation of Laws of Nature
Ch. 13: Miscellaneous Examples of the Explanation of the Laws of Nature

VOLUME II
Book III (continued)
Ch. 14: On the Limits to the Explanation of Laws of Nature; and of Hypotheses
Ch. 15: Of Progressive Effects; and of the Continued Action of Causes
Ch. 16: Of Empirical Laws
Ch. 17: Of Chance, and Its Elimination
Ch. 18: Of the Calculation of Chances
Ch. 19: Of the Extension of Derivative Laws to Adjacent Cases
Ch. 20: Of Analogy
Ch. 21: Of the Evidence of the Law of Universal Causation
Ch. 22: OF the Uniformities of Coexistence not dependent on Causation
Ch. 23: Of Approximate Generalizations, and Probable Evidence
Ch. 24: Of the Remaining Laws of Nature
Ch. 25: Of the Grounds of Disbelief 

Book IV: Of Operations subsidiary to Induction
Ch. 1: Of Observation and Description
Ch. 2: Of Abstraction, or the Formation of Conceptions
Ch. 3: Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction
Ch. 4: Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Language; and the Principle of Definition
Ch. 5: On the Natural History of the Variations in the Meaning of Terms
Ch. 6: The Principles of a Philosophical Language further considered
Ch. 7: Of Classification, as subsidiary to Induction
Ch. 8: Of Classification by Series 

Book V: Of Fallacies
Ch. 1: Of Fallacies in general
Ch. 2: Classification of Fallacies
Ch. 3: Fallacies of Simple Inspection or a priori Fallacies
Ch. 4: Fallacies of Observation
Ch. 5: Fallacies of Generalization
Ch. 6: Fallacies of Ratiocination
Ch. 7: Fallacies of Confusion 

Book VI: On the Logic of the Moral Sciences
Ch. 1: Introductory remarks
Ch. 2: Of Liberty and Necessity
Ch. 3: That there is, or may be, a Science of Human Nature
Ch. 4: Of the Laws of Mind
Ch. 5: Of Ethology, or the Science of the Formation of Character
Ch. 6: General Considerations on the Social Sciences
Ch. 7: Of the Chemical, or Experimental, Method in the Social Sciences
Ch. 8: Of the Geometrical, or Abstract Method
Ch. 9: Of the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method
Ch. 10: Of the Inverse Deduction, or Historical Method
Ch. 11: Additional Elucidations of the Science of History
Ch. 12: Of the Logic of Practices, or Art; including Morality and Policy

čtvrtek 13. ledna 2011

Kahn: Řecké sloveso 'být' a pojem bytí - John Stuart Mill

Podívejme se podrobněji na Kahnův článek "The Greek Verb “To Be” and the Concept of Being" (1966). Hlavní pointu svého článku vidí Kahn v retrospektivě jako počátek útoku proti "existenčně-predikativní dichotomii" a jako rehabilitaci dalších významů či užití 'být', především tzv. veritativního užití (veridical; viz předmluva k Essays on Being, 2009). Této dichotomi či spíše tetratomii, protože se k ní připočítávají i další významy 'být' (striktní identita a inkluze tříd) se dnes přezdívá Frege-Russelova teze, viz např. již probíraný článek Barry Millera (11.1.2011). Kahn ovšem kořeny této dichotomie/tetratomie sleduje až k Millovu System of Logic (vol. 1, 2) kniha I, kap. 4, §1 z r. 1843/1862. Odtud prý bylo toto pojetí převzato nejen v rodící se symbolické logice, ale i v gramatikách starořečtiny. Jedná se o natolik převratnou kapitolku s tak hlubokým dopadem na lingvistiku a filosofii 20. století, že ji zde s dovolením celou ocituji (z časových důvodů bez překladu):

     A proposition ... is a portion of discourse in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. ... but as we cannot conclude from merely seeing two names put together, that they are intended to be affirmed of denied of the other ... it is necessary that there should be some mode or form of indicating that such is the intention. .. . This is sometimes done by a slight alteration of one of the words, called an inflection ; as when we say, Fire burns... . But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word is, when an affirmation is intended, is not, when a negation; or by some other part of the verb to be. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called as we formely observed, the copula. It is important that there should be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the copula; for confused notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread mysticism over the field of logic, and perverted its speculations into logomachies.
[A] It is apt to be supposed that the copula is something more than a mere sign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the proposition, Socrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that the quality just can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that Socrates is, that is to say exists. This, however, only show that there is an ambiguity in the word is; a word which not only performs the function of the copula in affirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of which it may itself be made the predicate of a proposition. That the employment of it as a copula does not necessarily include the affirmation of existence, appears from such a proposition as this, A centaur is a fiction of the poets; where it cannot possibly be implied that a centaur exists, since the proposition itself expressly asserts that the thing has no real existence. 
 [B] Many volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations concerning the nature of Being (τὸ ὄν, oὐσία, Ens, Entitas, Essentia, and the like) which have arisen from overlooking this double meaning of the word to be; from supposing that when it signifies to exist, and when it signifies to be some specified thing, as to be a man, to be Socrates, to be seen or spoken of, to be a phantom, even to be a nonentity, it must, still, at bottom, answer to the same idea; and that a meaning must be found for it which shall suit all these cases. The fog which rose from this narrow spot diffused itself at an early period over the whole surface of metaphysics. [C] Yet it becomes us not to triumph over the great intellects of Plato and Aristotle because we are now able to preserve ourselves from many errors into which they, perhaps inevitably, fell. The fireteazer of a modern steam-engine produces by his exertions far greater effects than Milo of Crotona could, but he is not therefore a stronger man. [D] The Greeks seldom knew any language but their own. This rendered it far more difficult for them than it is for us, to acquire a readiness in detecting ambiguities. One of the advantages of having accurately studied a plurality of languages, especially of those languages which eminent thinkers have used as the vehicle of their thoughs, is the practical lesson we learn respecting the ambiguities of words, by finding that the same word in one language corresponds, on different occasions, to different words in another. When not this exerciese, even the strongest understandings find it difficult to believe that things which have a common names, have not in some respect or other a common nature; and often expend much laboure not only unprofitably but mischievously (as was frequently done by the two philosphers just mentioned) in vain attempts to discover in what this common nature consists. But the habit once formed, intellects much inferior are capable of detecting even ambiguities which are common to many languages: and it is surprising that the one now under consideration, though it exists in the modern languages as well as in the ancient, should have been overlooked by almost all authors. [E] The quantity of futile speculation which had been causes by a misapprehension of the nature of the copula, was hinted at by Hobbes; but Mr. Mill (Analysis of the Human Mind, i. 126 et seqq.) was, I believe, the first who distinctly characterized the ambiguity, and pointed out how many errors in the received systems of philosophy it has had to answer for. It has indeed misled the moderns scarcely less than the ancients, though their mistakes, because our understandings are not yet so completely emancipated from their influence, do not appear equally irrational.

Mill zde tvrdí řadu věcí, z nichž bych rád vyzvihl následující:
[A] Slovesná spona 'je' má dva základní (a zcela odlišné) významy: predikativní a existenční. Argument: predikujeme i o neexistujích subjektech.
[B] Přehlédnutí této dvojznačnosti vedlo k metafyzickým pseudoproblémům ohledně bytí a spřízněných témat.
[C] To, že je nám tato dvojznačnost jasná, neznamená, že jsme chytřejší než Platón či Aristotelés, kteří ji přehlédli.
[D] Důvodem jejich přehlédnutí byla neznalost jiných jazyků než řečtiny.
[E] Dvojznačnost pravděpodobně objevil Millův otec, James Mill (1773–1836, k jeho politickému myšlení viz SEP).
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