Kniha bude vycházet z mé disertace (obhájené v r. 2008), ovšem je třeba ji aktualizovat, protože jsem publikoval v mezičase řadu článků a dále bych rád integroval alespoň nejdůležitější literaturu, která zatím vyšla. V posledních dnech se např. znovu zabývám články John P. Doyla, které vloni vyšly jako "vybrané sebrané spisy" (kompletní bibliografii udržuje Raul Corazzon):
Collected Studies on Francisco Suarez SJ (1548-1617)
eds. Victor Salas and John P. Doyle (Leuven: Leuven Uni Press, 2010)
(G-BOOKS z nějakého důvodu stále ještě uvádí jako editora Martina Stona, místo Victora Salase).
Obsah:
- Francisco Suárez, His Life, His Works, His Doctrine, and Some of His Influence
- Suárez on the Reality of the Possibles (1967)
- Suárez on the Analogy of Being (1969)
- Suarezian and Thomistic Metaphysics before Judgement of Heidegger (1972)
- The Suarezian Proof for God's Existence (1982)
- Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J. (1984)
- Suárez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1987-1988)
- Suárez on the Unity of a Scientific Habit (1991)
- Suárez on the Truth of the Proposition "This is My Body" (2000)
- Suárez on Preaching the Gospel on the Law of Nations
- Suárez on Human Rights
- Francisco Suárez on the Interpretation of Laws
- Postscript and Prospects
- Bibliography, Index of Names and Index of Terms
Novum je v této knize pouze první bio-bibliografický esej a poslední postscript. V úvodu Doyle výstižně shrnuje své příspěvky (v retrospektivě mnohem jasněji než tak, jak je původně publikoval). V postskriptu Doyle klade důraz na "supertranscendentálie" a jejich význam. Zvýrazněná kurzíva je teze, kde s ním nesouhlasím:
"Again, looking forward to seventeenth-century disciples of Suárez, usually but not exclusively Jesuits, the articles in this collection may prompt research into their advancement of a new concept of "supertranscendental" being. This was a concept wide enough to embrace both the real being which Suárez termed the object of metaphysics and the being of reason which he, like Aristotle and all his followers, excluded from that object. My publications since the origian appearance of most of the present articles have included an entry entitles, "Supertranszendent," which I wrote for volume 10 (1999) of the Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie. As far as I know, this entry marks the first time the subject of supertranscendental being has been addressed in any philosophical dictionary or encyclopedia. In my estimate, however, it is only the harbinger of a radically new assessment of the role of Suárez and his disciples in the development of seventeenth-century metaphysics and epistemology, all the way to a general theory of objects. Foremost among those who have seen this is Jean-Françoise Courtine, who thinking back to the ancient Stoics, has aptly given this theory and knowledge of supertranscendental being the name of "tinology".
This development occured in the areas of intentionality and of the modern shift from a naive confidence in our ability to know things in themselves toward more reflection upon knowers and what they can know. This was away from real being outside the mind and toward objectivity as such. From my own research, I can say that, in the Jesuit tradition after Suárez, this shift centered on what he in the wake of Aristotle and Aristotelians before himself had excluded from the subject matter of metaphysics, namely, beings of reason. By the end of the seventeenth century, far from being excluded, such beings, explicitly equated with Aristotle's "being as true," were at the heart of metaphysics and, concequent to that, at the heart of both theoretical and practical philosophy. [Note 6: For some essays in which I have developed facets of this, let me direct the reader to "'Extrinsic Cognoscibility': A Seventeenth-Century Super-transcendental Notion," The Modern Schoolman 68 (1990): 57-80; "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects," The Review of Metaphysics 48 (1995): 771-808; "Between Transcendental and Transcendental: The Missing Link?" The Review of Metaphysics 50 (1997): 783-815; and "Supertranscendental Nothing: A Philosophical Finisterre," Medioevo 24 (1998): 1-30." (pp. 390-391)
Doyle by dále rád prozkoumal 'ens morale' a to je opravdu projekt užitečný:
"Joining theoretical with practical and then continuing to to explore post-Suarezian though on super-transcendentals, I would want to develop a territory where others, most notably Theo Kobusch [Note 8: Cf. Sein und Sprache: Historische Grundlegung eine Ontologie der Sprache ... 1987, and Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und modernes Menschenbild ... 1997], have pioneered. This is the area of "moral being" (ens morale). Bolstered by various findings in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Scholastic philosophy, I see moral being as the volitional side of being of reason. As being of reason is formed in the wake of intellectual activity, moral being owes its undeniable reality to the activity of human wills. Among other things, I am thinking of items like jurisdiction, the authority of judges, legal litigations, contracts, rights and duties - especially, property rights, their registration, and their recognition - legal wills, the value of coins or of words, academic qualifications and degrees, signs generally, promises, and a myriad of other things which are dependent upon human willing and which introduce new, not evidently categorial, facts into the world of human persons. Suárez has in different contexts dealt with such things and dealing with them became commonplace in those and other contexts among Jesuits and non-Jesuits after, who mutatis mutandis were dependent upon him or who shared a common outlook with him. For this last, I immediately recall his fellow Jesuits at the University of Coimbra, the so-called Conimbricenses, a major portion of whose semiotic theory I recently made available to English readers [Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs, 2001]." (pp. 391-392)
Doyle své celoživotní studium renezanční a barokní scholastiky shrnuje a dále s Boží pomocí plánuje takto:
"... my research sine the original appearance of the essays in this collection is leading in two directions. I want on one side to show that in the seventeenth century of Descartes and others depending so much on the notion of objective being, disciples of Suárez were developing a detailed and sophisticated understanding of objective being and intentionality itself. On the other side, in the same century when so many modern ideas of personal rights, citizenship, government, and international law were taking shape, people like Locke, Grotius, Pufendorf, and the Wolff, were reading Suárez and being influenced by him. Linking both sides together is again the two notions of beings of reason and moral beings. To set the stage for all of this provides a main rationale for making the materials in this colleciton available to awider readership." (p. 392)
Vůči této velkolepe vizi jsem ovšem skeptický hned ve dvou ohledech: (1) Tematika objektivního bytí a intencionality je širší než tematika pomyslných jsoucen a to jak pro Suáreze, tak pro Descarta (ten dokonce výraz ens rationis téměř nepoužívá); pomyslná jsoucna jsou speciálním případem nutně nemožných intentionálních jsoucen a mimo tradiční tomismus/skotismus hrají v rámci filosofických systémů okrajovou roli. (2) Propojení tematiky pomyslných a morálních jsoucen je výborný nápad, ovšem z hlediska systematického, nikoli historického: nenašel jsem zatím žádného barokního autora, který by toto propojení explicitně rozpracoval či alespoň zmínil.
